In Sweden, immigration policy is once again at the centre of political and public debate — this time around a particularly sensitive and emotionally charged issue: the deportation of young people who grew up in Sweden, but who risk losing their right to stay once they turn 18. On 4 February, three opposition parties — the Centre Party (Centerpartiet), the Green Party (Miljöpartiet) and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) — called for a rapid legal change aimed at stopping what Swedish media and NGOs often describe as “teen deportations”: cases where young migrants, often well integrated into Swedish society, are forced to leave after reaching adulthood.
What the proposal says (in practical terms)
At the heart of the issue is the legal definition of who counts as a dependent child. Right now, Sweden’s rules often treat children as dependents only up to age 18. That means:
• parents may have legal residency through a work permit,
• the family may have lived in Sweden for years,
• the child may have gone through Swedish schools, learned Swedish, built a life there…
…but once the child turns 18, they may no longer qualify automatically as a dependent — and may need to secure an independent residence permit through work or studies. If they cannot, deportation becomes a real possibility. The opposition parties propose a relatively “simple” fix:
extend dependent eligibility from 18 to 21 for children of work permit holders and others with residency permits. This would effectively create a three-year buffer in which young adults could:
• finish high school,
• begin higher education or vocational training,
• or enter the labour market and qualify for their own permit.
“It could be changed quickly if there was a will”
Green Party MP Annika Hirvonen (often active on immigration-related issues) argued that the law could be changed rapidly if parliament chooses to act, and claimed there may be broad support for such a reform. This framing is politically important: it positions the reform not as a complex long-term migration overhaul, but as a targeted correction — a way to prevent young people from being caught in a bureaucratic cliff-edge.
The deeper Nordic question: what does Sweden want to be?
In many ways, this debate is not just about residency permits. It touches on Nordic identity politics, and the long-running tension between two ideas:
1. Sweden as a humanitarian, integration-oriented society (a “moral superpower” in older narratives)
2. Sweden as a stricter, conditional immigration system prioritising enforcement and state control
The teen deportations topic lands right in the middle because it forces a difficult question:
If a young person has grown up in Sweden, speaks the language and has gone through Swedish schooling — are they still “a migrant”, or are they already part of the country?
That question is not unique to Sweden.
Parallels in the other Nordic countries
While Sweden’s proposal is very specific (dependency age extension to 21 for children of work permit holders), similar dynamics exist across the Nordics, especially where immigration systems are built around:
• temporary permits,
• strict criteria for family reunification,
• transition rules from youth to adulthood,
• employment thresholds.
🇩🇰 Denmark: strictness as policy brand
Denmark is widely considered the Nordic country with the most restrictive migration framework overall — with policies designed explicitly around limiting residency pathways.
Parallel: Denmark has repeatedly tightened rules affecting:
• family reunification
• permanent residency
• and transitions from one permit type to another (especially employment-based residency)
So while Sweden is debating “buffer years”, Denmark tends to prioritise the opposite principle:
adulthood = personal responsibility + tougher requirements.
Narrative similarity: Denmark has had many debates where young adults feel “de facto Danish”, but remain legally precarious.
🇳🇴 Norway: integration vs documentation
Norway’s system is also rules-based and can be strict, but tends to place strong emphasis on:
• stable income
• documented employment
• and correct permit categories
Parallel: young migrants can face “permit trap” situations where:
• parents are legal residents,
• but the child’s own legal basis becomes unclear after 18.
Norway differs from Sweden mainly in tone and scale — but the legal cliff at adulthood exists there too.
🇫🇮 Finland: bureaucratic risk + labour migration complexity
Finland has been increasing labour migration policies while also keeping strict administrative controls.
Parallel: Finland, like Sweden, has cases where:
• families arrive through work permits,
• children integrate quickly,
• but the transition to adulthood requires navigating complex permit categories.
The similarity is structural: labour migration is welcomed, but family permanence is not always guaranteed.
🇮🇸 Iceland: small system, similar dilemmas
Iceland has a smaller population and fewer cases overall, but the same principle applies: residency is often conditional, particularly for non-EEA citizens.
Parallel: fewer political headlines, but similar legal reality.
Why the “21-year threshold” matters (symbolically)
Choosing 21 is not random. It signals an understanding that in modern Nordic societies:
• finishing secondary education often happens around 18–19,
• entering stable employment can take longer,
• and young adults increasingly remain economically dependent.
So the proposal isn’t just about migrants — it reflects a broader cultural fact: The transition to adulthood has slowed down. Sweden is basically being asked: should migration law match real life?
ATN perspective: a Nordic debate with a European future
This Swedish debate is important beyond Sweden, because it sits at the intersection of two big trends:
1. Nordic labour market needs (aging populations, skill shortages)
2. political pressure for immigration control (identity politics, welfare-state protection, security framing)
If Sweden changes the dependency rule to 21, it could:
• influence policy debates in neighbouring countries,
• become a reference point for NGOs and opposition parties elsewhere,
• and reframe the Nordic model as more continuity-based (belonging) rather than permit-based (paperwork).
Read more on MrInstitutet.se, Researchgate.net, SverigesRadio.se, Theseus.fi
